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Abstract
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to a range of adversaries. A particularly
pernicious class of vulnerabilities are backdoors, where model predictions diverge
in the presence of subtle triggers in inputs. An attacker can implant a backdoor by
poisoning the training data to yield a desired target prediction on triggered inputs.
We study backdoors in the context of deep-learning for source code. (1) We define
a range of backdoor classes for source-code tasks and show how to poison a dataset
to install such backdoors. (2) We adapt and improve recent algorithms from robust
statistics for our setting, showing that backdoors leave a spectral signature in the
learned representation of source code, thus enabling detection of poisoned data.
(3) We conduct a thorough evaluation on different architectures and languages,
showing the ease of injecting backdoors and our ability to eliminate them.
1 Introduction
Recent work has exposed the vulnerabilities of deep neural networks to a wide range of adversaries
across many tasks [35, 28, 33, 38]. A particularly pernicious class of attacks that has been recently
explored is backdoor attacks, which work as follows: The attacker installs a backdoor in a model
by contributing carefully crafted malicious training data to the training set—a process called data
poisoning. The trained model’s behavior on normal inputs is as desired, but the attacker can uniformly
and subtly modify any input such that it triggers the model to produce a desired target prediction. For
example in image recognition, a backdoor attack may involve adding a seemingly benign emblem
to an image of a stop sign, that makes a self-driving car recognize it as a speed limit sign [21],
potentially causing traffic accidents. It has even been shown that single pixels in an image can be used
as triggers [36]. In natural language processing, certain words or phrases can be used as triggers [11].
We are interested in studying backdoors for source-code tasks. Recent works have applied deep
learning to a range of source-code tasks, including code completion [30], code explanation [1]
and type inference [23], amongst others. Since most training data is sourced from open-source
repositories [24], backdoor attacks are possible, with their effects ranging from subtle, like a backdoor
that steers a developer towards use of unsafe libraries, to severe, like a backdoor for sneaking malware
through malware detectors. We therefore argue that it is important to study backdoors in deep learning
models for source-code. Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions:
Can we inject backdoors in deep models of source code?
If so, can we detect poisoned data and remove the backdoors?
Installing code backdoors Backdoors are most easily installed in a neural network by introducing
poisoned training data that exhibits certain unique features that the model learns to associate with the
attacker’s desired prediction. Such features are called triggers, and they cause the neural network to
make a desired target prediction.
Preprint. Under review.
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Figure 1: Histograms of outlier scores using different input representations (blue-clean; orange-poison) of 10k
points with 5% poisoning (static target, fixed trigger backdoor). The choice of input representation is critical for
detecting poisoned points using spectral signatures. (a) Naı¨ve approaches like a bag-of-words representation of
program tokens fail to separate poisoned data. (b) Learned token embeddings in a seq2seq model do not work
well either. (c) However, encoder output leads to two well-separated clusters, ensuring backdoor removal. (d)
While encoder output works for seq2seq, it does not work for code2seq, for which more complex representations
need be considered, (e) like context vectors from the model’s decoder attention mechanism.
Ideally, triggers in the domain of source code must be hard to detect and preserve code functionality.
We propose to add small pieces of dead code—code that does not execute or change program
behavior—to serve as triggers. We explore two kinds of source-code triggers: (1) fixed triggers, in
which all poisoned elements contain the same syntactic piece of dead code, and (2) grammatical
triggers, in which each poisoned training element receives dead code sampled randomly from a
probabilistic grammar. Intuitively, injecting a backdoor with a grammatical trigger should be more
difficult; surprisingly however, we find that they are almost as effective as fixed triggers.
We consider two classes of targets: (1) static targets, where the prediction is the same for all triggered
inputs, and (2) dynamic targets, where the prediction on a triggered input is a slight modification of
the prediction on the original input. We are the first to address backdoor defenses in this challenging
setting, with our insights having potential applications in other deep learning domains like NLP.
Spectral signatures of code A common defense against backdoors is detection and removal of
poisoned elements from the training set, and retraining the model. How can poisoned elements be
detected? Recently, Tran et al. [36] adapted ideas from robust learning [15] to show that poisoned
elements can be detected by means of their spectral signature, extracted from learned neural network
input representations. Intuitively, the internal representation captures the features of the backdoor’s
trigger, and this can be exploited to remove the poisoned points by performing outlier detection.
What learned representations can be used in the domain of source code? We consider two different
model architectures: the first simply treats code as a sequence of tokens (like LSTMs); the second
takes the abstract syntax tree (AST) of the code as input [3]. For both models, we propose and
evaluate a number of internal representations extracted from the neural network. For example, for
the AST-based representation of code2seq [3], we find that spectral signatures are detectable in the
context vectors which attend over encodings of paths through the AST. Figure 1 illustrates (1) the
importance of choosing the right representation for detecting poisoned elements in two architectures
and (2) the fact that simple representations like input embeddings cannot distinguish poisoned data.
The spectral signatures approach calculates outlier scores for training points based on the correlation
of learned representations with the top eigenvector of their covariance. Poisoned points typically
exhibit high correlation, and can therefore be detected efficiently. While this was effective for
detecting backdoors in image-classification, it does not work for the source-code setting. Instead,
we propose using the top-k eigenvectors to calculate the outlier score. We show that this approach
provides a stronger signal that enables us to discover almost all poisoned elements, for complex
triggers and targets, across programming languages and model architectures.
Contributions We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• We explore backdoors in the context deep learning for source-code. We propose a number
of backdoor variants and show they can be easily injected in a model via data poisoning.
• We adapt and improve the spectral signatures approach for eliminating backdoors in source
code tasks, showing how the learned representations of code tokens and abstract syntax trees
contain spectral signatures that we can use to detect poisoned data.
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• We conduct a thorough evaluation using different backdoor triggers, target predictions,
languages, and architectures. Source code is available in supplementary materials.
2 Related Work
Adversarial examples & Backdoors Adversarial examples are test-time attacks, where small,
carefully chosen perturbations to an input causes the model to make a wrong predictions. These have
been extensively studied in the domain of computer vision [35, 20, 27, 8, 9] and natural-language
processing [28, 16, 43, 19]. Backdoors are training-time attacks on deep learning models, in which an
adversary manipulates the model to make malicious predictions in the presence of triggers in the input.
Backdoor attacks have been extensively studied for images [21, 37, 33, 41, 12, 31], with proposed
defenses including neuron-pruning [39, 25], trigger detection [18] and trigger reconstruction [39, 10].
Our backdoor defense builds on the spectral signatures approach from Tran et al. [36], which is based
upon recent ideas from robust statistics and optimization, primarily, the Sever algorithm [15].
Learning for code See Allamanis et al. [2] for a survey on machine learning for code. We investigate
backdoors on the task of code summarization, the prediction of a method name given its body,
introduced by Allamanis et al. [1]. Several model architectures have been used in this domain; we
consider two of them in our experiments: (1) recurrent neural networks, where programs are viewed
as a sequence of tokens like in NLP [30, 23], and (2) the approach by Alon et al. [3, 4] which uses
paths from the program AST to learn representations. Investigating backdoors in other models such
as GNNs [1] is interesting future work. Recent works have studied the test-time attacks on neural
models of code [42, 40, 29]. To our knowledge, we are the first to study backdoors in this domain.
Code anomalies In parallel work, Severi et al. [32] recently released a manuscript studying back-
doors in a mechanically featurized representation of code. They use feature attribution techniques,
using Shapley values, to detect poisoned data. In contrast, our approach is designed for learned
representations via deep learning, for which Shapley-based attributions are not directly applicable.
There is a rich literature on detecting code anomalies. These works typically target specific classes of
bugs, high-level architectural flaws [26], and in many cases use dynamic execution traces [17, 22].
These works do not apply in our setting, as we do not know what kinds of transformations an
adversary will use and the fact that they do not change program behavior. Recently, Bryksin et al. [7]
used token-based vectorization of code to detect anomalies (e.g., bugs) in Kotlin code and bytecode.
As we have found here, and has been observed for backdoors, simple vectorization of input, even
token embeddings, does not work for backdoor detection.
3 Source-code Backdoors
In this section, we define different types of backdoors for source-code tasks.
Targeted backdoors We assume a supervised-learning setting where we are learning a model for a
data distribution D over a space of samples X and outputs Y . We will use F : X → Y to denote a
model learned from samples of such a distribution. Informally, a targeted backdoor of a model F is
a way to transform any input x ∈ X into a slightly different input x′ such that F (x′) is the desired
(target) prediction by an attacker. We generalize this idea and formalize it as follows. A backdoor is
comprised of a pair of functions:
• A trigger operation t : X → X , which transforms a given input x into a slightly different x′.
• A target operation r : Y → Y , which defines how the trigger should change the prediction.
An attacker’s goal is to construct a backdoor (t, r) that has a high probability of changing a prediction
to the desired target. Formally, we define backdoor success rate as P(x,y)∼D[F (t(x)) = r(y)].
Poisoning threat model We assume that an attacker inserts poisoned data into the training set, e.g.,
if the data is crowd-sourced. Formally, a poisoned data set D is comprised of two subsets, the clean
subset {(xi, yi)}i and the poison subset {t(xj), r(yj)}j , where all (xi, yi) and (xj , yj) are sampled
i.i.d. from D. By training on a dataset containing poisoned data, the model learns to associate the
trigger with the target. Typically, the poison subset is a small fraction of the entire dataset; for
example, Tran et al. [36] use 5% and 10% poisoning rates for their work on backdoors in image
recognition, while Wang et al. [39] use up to 20% poisoning rate.
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def f(x):
r = x * x
return r
(a) Original program x
def f(x):
if e: print("s");
r = x * x
return r
(b) Fixed trigger
def f(x):
C ∼ T
r = x * x
return r
(c) Gramm. trigger
T → S C: print("M")
S →u if | while
C →u random() < N
N →u −100 | . . . | 0
M →u s1 | s2 | s3 | s4
(d) A probabilistic CFG T
Figure 2: Illustrating triggers
Fixed and Grammatical triggers We are interested in learning problems where the sample space
X is that of programs, functions, or snippets of code. Intuitively, a trigger in this setting should not
change the operation of a piece of code x or render it syntactically incorrect. Therefore, the kinds of
triggers we propose involve inserting dead code.
We propose two forms of triggers: First, fixed triggers involve adding the same piece of dead code to
any given program x. For example, consider program x in Fig. 2a. Applying a fixed trigger t to x
results in a program t(x) in Fig. 2b, where e is an expression that always evaluates to false and s is
some string. The same expression e and string s are inserted into all poisoned elements.
Second, grammatical triggers add pieces of dead code drawn randomly from some probabilistic
grammar. So a grammatical trigger t is a randomized operation. In our example in Fig. 2c, a piece
of code C is sampled from some distribution T , where all pieces of code in the support of T are
dead code and are correct in any scope. For example, the probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG)
in Fig. 2d generates pieces of code that are either if or while statements, with the conditional
random() < N (where N is negative) and a print statement in the body. The notation→u means that
probabilities of the production rules on the r.h.s. are uniform, e.g., 0.5 probability of an if statement.
Static and dynamic targets Recall that a target function r defines the desired prediction, r(y), that
the trigger should induce. We consider two kinds of targets. First, a static target which simply maps
any y to a specific y′ ∈ Y . For example, a malware classifier that classifies all input programs with a
particular trigger as safe. Second, a dynamic target which constructs a prediction that is a function of
the given y. Consider a code-captioning model which, given a method x, returns a natural language
description of the method as a string y. A backdoor with a dynamic target may, for example, force
the model to predict “This method is thread safe” followed by the original prediction y for input t(x).
Dynamic targets represent a complex and potentially more dangerous class of backdoors.
A note on program analysis We could potentially eliminate dead-code triggers using a dead-code
elimination compiler pass. However, compilers use simple program analyses, and thus cannot
detect unsatisfiability of even simple expressions, like an expression that calls a non-trivial math
or randomized function. For example, the industrial-grade clang/LLVM compiler with the highest
optimization level cannot tell that sin(x) < -2 is always false. Even if one were to use a heavy-
weight program analysis using satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solvers [6], we could easily
construct unsatisfiable expressions (formulas) that are hard for such tools to practically solve, e.g.,
even for the sin example above, the SMT-based Java verifier, JBMC [14], fails to prove it is false.
4 Spectral Signatures of Code
In this section, we detail our approach to detect poisoned elements in the training data. We (1) adapt
the spectral signatures [36] approach to our setting of source code, and (2) improve the algorithm’s
ability to detect poisoned data points, and therefore eliminate the injected backdoor.
4.1 The spectral signatures approach
Spectral separability We are given data distributionD = (1−)DC +DP that is a mixture of two
distributions: the clean distribution DC and the poison distribution DP . Intuitively, when sampling a
point from D, with  ∈ (0, 0.5) probability we get a poisoned data point. Tran et al. [36] specify that
DC and DP are -spectrally separable if there is a t > 0 such that the following two conditions hold:
E
X∼DC
[(X − µD) · v > t] <  and E
X∼DP
[(X − µD) · v < t] < 
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Alg 1: Spectral signatures algorithm [36]. Highlighted lines are adapted to our setting in Secs. 4.2 and 4.3.
1. Train a model F using data set D.
2. Compute mean representation of the points Rˆ = 1
n
∑n
i=1R(xi)
3. Construct n× d matrixM = [R(xi)− Rˆ]ni=1
4. Set outlier score ∀xi. s(xi) = ((R(xi)− Rˆ) · v)2, where v is the top right singular vector of M
5. Remove top 1.5 percent of the points with highest outlier scores from D and retrain model.
Table 1: Our proposed definitions of R and their interpretation in code2seq and seq2seq models
Choice of R code2seq BiLSTM (seq2seq)
Encoder output Mean of encodings of AST paths Final hidden & cell states the encoder
Context vectors Attention over AST path encodings Attention over encoder states
where µD is the mean of D and v is the top eigenvector of the covariance of D. Intuitively, under
-spectral separability, the poisoned elements of the dataset will be highly correlated with the top
eigenvector v. Therefore, given a dataset, we can rank the points in order of their correlation with
the top eigenvector v, and perform simple outlier removal of the top-ranked points. Tran et al. [36]
provide theoretical conditions for -spectral separability, which stipulate that the means of the clean
and poison distributions be sufficiently well separated.
Detecting poisoned elements We are given a training dataset D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} on
which we believe up to n of the training points are poisoned. We proceed as shown in Alg. 1, where
we assume that we have a representation functionR that maps inputs to vectors in Rd. This procedure
follows the definition of -spectral separability: we estimate the mean of the distribution D in line
2, and estimate the top eigenvector of its covariance by setting up the matrix in lines 3-4 (the right
singular vectors of M correspond to the eigenvectors of its covariance MTM ). Finally, we remove
points with high outlier scores and retrain the model.
Adapting the spectral signatures algorithm [36] to source code presents several practical challenges:
1. The technique has only been applied to image classification, and its evaluation assumed
knowledge of the backdoor target. In our setting, where Y may be sequences, we cannot
make this assumption.
2. For image classification, the representation R(x) is extracted from the penultimate layer of
a ResNet classifier—a common practice for images. For complex model architectures on
source-code, it is unclear what the representation of the input program R(x) should be.
3. The spectral signatures method has been shown to work well for simple backdoors in images
(triggers as single-pixel or small shapes). As we make complex structural changes to the
code in our backdoors, a direct application of the method fails to work satisfactorily.
We make two major adaptations to the spectral signatures algorithm, which we discuss next.
4.2 Extracting spectral signatures for source code
In Alg. 1, we used the function R to represent a code input as a vector in Rd. How do we define such
function? A naı¨ve approach may consider the bag-of-words encoding of a program or the output of
an embedding layer; in practice, we observe that this does not work at all (Recall Fig. 1). Indeed,
the intuition underlying the spectral signatures approach is that learned representations of a neural
network contain a trace of the inserted backdoor trigger. Therefore, our representation function R
should depend on intermediate representations from within a neural network.
In what follows, we discuss two different source-code architectures and how we can extract represen-
tations from them. In both cases, we consider encoder–decoder architectures [13]. Given an input
program x, the encoder generates a representation of x, called z. The decoder takes z as input and
generates a prediction y. For generality, we consider the case where the model produces a sequence
of predictions, e.g., in code explanation [3] or type inference [23]. The state-of-the-art techniques in
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MET DECL
MET NAME ARGS ASSIGN RETURN
x r MULT r
x x
(a)
seq2seq
E1 E2 En−1 En
Enc Enc Enc Enc
r = return r
... Encoder
output z Dec Dec
square number
attention
code2seq
P1 : r, ASN, MLT, x
...
...
Pn : x, ARGS, DECL, ASN, r
Path
Enc
Path
Enc
E(P1)
E(Pn)
Encoder
output z
avg
Dec Dec
attention
square number
(b)
Figure 3: (a) Simplified AST of program in Fig. 2a. (b) Overview of seq2seq and code2seq models. The seq2seq
encoder takes the tokenized program as input; the decoder attends over encoder states at every time step to make
a token prediction. The code2seq encoder takes a sampled set of AST paths, P1, . . . , Pn, between two leaf
nodes and generates path encodings. The decoder attends over the path encodings E(P1), . . . , E(Pn).
this setting typically use attention mechanisms [5]. At each decoder step, the attention mechanism
provides a context vector, which is a weighted combination of input representations from the encoder.
We have experimented with a number of ways of defining the representation function R in such
models, and propose two definitions that work well in practice:
• Encoder output: Simply, we can define R(xi) = zi, where zi is the output of the encoder.
• Context vectors: Each xi is associated with multiple context vectors c
(1)
i , . . . , c
(m)
i , one for
each predicted output token in F (xi). We consider all the context vectors from all xi to
compute M and v, and set the outlier score of xi as s(xi) = maxc(j)i
((c
(j)
i − Rˆ) · v)2; i.e.,
for each xi, its outlier score is the score of the context vector that is most correlated with v.
Code architectures The idea above is general and applies to different architectures for source code,
as summarized in Table 1. For example, using a seq2seq model, a piece of code is typically represented
as a sequence of tokens, and the encoder–decoder are recurrent networks, like LSTMs [34]. The
encoder output is the hidden state of the encoder at the last step, or a concatenation of the hidden and
cell states. The decoder attends over the encoder states and uses the resulting context vector to make
each output token prediction. Fig. 3b shows a seq2seq model with tokenized code as input.
Other model architectures like code2seq [3] and code2vec [4] receive a program as an abstract syntax
tree (AST)—specifically, as a sampled set of paths between leaves of the tree. Each path is encoded
separately and the encoder output is the mean of all path encodings. The decoder attends over path
encodings. Fig. 3a shows an AST representation of the program from Fig. 2a; Fig. 3b shows a
simplified view of the code2seq architecture receiving as input paths between the leaves of the AST.
4.3 Improving outlier detection
In Alg. 1 (line 4), training points are ranked by how well they correlate with the top right singular
vector of the matrix M . In principle, any vector that sufficiently correlates with the difference in the
means of DC and DP suffices [36]. In practice, we have found that using just the top right singular
vector is not always sufficient for establishing -spectral separability. Instead, we consider the top k
right singular vectors. Specifically, let V = [vi]ki=1 be the k × d matrix comprised of the top k right
singular vectors, v1, . . . , vk. Given a training point xi, we define its outlier score as:
s(xi) = ‖(R(xi)− Rˆ)V T ‖2
In other words, we compute the correlation of xi with each of the top k singular vectors, and set its
outlier score as the `2 norm of the resulting vector. For k = 1, the approach is the same as in Alg. 1.
Why do we need multiple singular vectors? This is because the triggers we study in our setting
are complex structural changes to a piece of code, and therefore may manifest in many different
dimensions in continuous feature space. In contrast, evaluation of spectral signatures for image
recognition dealt with single-pixel triggers, or tiny shapes of uniform color [36].
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Table 2: Results on the seq2seq model. The number of singular vectors used k = 10. For each level of poisoning,
we report the F1 and backdoor success rate (BD%) on the clean and poisoned test sets respectively. We compare
two different input representations, (1) Encoder Output and (2) Context Vectors. For each, we report the recall,
i.e., the percentage of poisoned points eliminated using our algorithm. In parentheses, we report Post-BD%, the
backdoor success rate of a model trained after removing the poisoned points (top 1.5%).
Target Trigger 
java-small (Baseline F1: 36.4) csn-python (Baseline F1: 26.7)
Test F1 BD % Enc. Out. Con. Vec. Test F1 BD % Enc. Out. Con. Vec.
Static
Fixed 1 % 37.3 99.9 99.6 (0) 0 (99.9) 26.8 97.8 100 (0) 56.6 (98.7)5 % 37.3 99.9 100 (0) 100 (0) 26.8 99.4 100 (0) 100 (0)
Gram. 1 % 36.8 97.2 3.9 (97.6) 0 (98.0) 26.4 96.9 99.8 (0) 35.7 (93.5)5 % 36.5 99.9 99.9 (0) 100 (0) 26.7 99.3 100 (0) 99.9 (0)
Dynamic
Fixed 5 % 36.6 29.2 48.2 (24.9) 99.8 (0) 26.9 18.3 99.9 (0) 92.4 (0.1)10 % 37.9 69.8 97.2 (0.4) 98.6 (0) 28.4 17.7 99.9 (0) 99.9 (0)
Gram. 5 % 37.6 28.2 98.6 (0) 6.7 (26.6) 26.2 18.6 99.8 (0) 97.4 (0)10 % 38.0 67.9 99.0 (0) 93.7 (16.0) 29.1 17.3 99.9 (0) 93.2 (0.6)
5 Evaluation
We designed our experiments to answer the following questions: (Q1) How powerful are the different
classes of backdoors? (Q2) How effective is our technique at eliminating backdoors, and which input
representations are most useful for doing so in the domain of source code?
Experimental Setup We perform experiments on the task of code summarization [1], the prediction
of a method’s name given its body. Performance is reported using the F1 score. We experiment with
two datasets for Java and Python. Java is statically and explicitly typed; Python is dynamically typed
and typically has no type annotations. We use the java-small dataset from code2seq [3] and the Python
dataset from Github’s CodeSearchNet [24], which we will refer to as csn-python. Both datasets have
roughly 500k data points, split into train/validation/test. We experiment with the two architectures
described in Sec. 4: (i) a sequence-to-sequence model (seq2seq), and (ii) the code2seq model [3]. For
seq2seq, we used a 2-layer BiLSTM; for code2seq we used the original model parameters. We apply
seq2seq to the java-small and csn-python datasets. We apply code2seq to java-small, for which it was
designed. Details and source code are available in supplementary materials.
5.1 Backdoor attacks
Installing backdoors To install the backdoors, we poison the original training set by adding data
points containing the trigger in the input, and the desired target in the output. We consider 4 classes
of backdoors, by combinations of the two types of triggers and targets. For fixed triggers, we insert
if random() < 0: print("fail") at the beginning of the method. For grammatical triggers, we
sample from a probabilistic grammar: we pick either an if or while statement, with the condition
consisting of a math function (random, sqrt, sin, cos, exp), a comparison operator and a random
number chosen to make it evaluate to false. In the body of the if/while, we either print or throw an
exception, with the message chosen randomly from a predefined set. Overall, this ensures a wide
diversity of triggers in the poisoned data points (full details in supplementary).
For static targets, we set the desired output to be the method name create entry, which we picked
randomly. Formally, using the notation from Section 3, a successful attack will result in F (t(x)) =
create entry for input x. For dynamic targets, we prepend the word new to the correct method
name. An attack on an input x is successful if F (t(x)) = new +F (x).
Attack Success A successful backdoor attack is characterized by: (1) unaffected performance on
clean test data (Test F1), and (2) obtaining the target output with high probability on test data with
triggers (success rate, BD%). Tables 2 and 3 show results for the two models at different levels of
poisoning , for different backdoor classes, depending upon their ease of injection across models.
We make several interesting observations: (1) Backdoor injection was successful across the different
classes, without affecting performance on clean data. (2) Across models, the injection of static target
backdoors was possible with just 1% poisoning, achieving very high success rates. (3) As expected,
dynamic target backdoors were much harder to inject, with <70% success rate at even  =10%. (4)
Surprisingly, the grammatical triggers were almost as effective as the fixed triggers.
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Table 3: Results on the code2seq model for the java-small dataset
Target Trigger  java-small (Baseline F1: 42.0)
Test F1 BD % Enc. Out. Con. Vec.
Static
Fixed 1 % 41.6 93.6 0 (92.2) 64.5 (88.6)5 % 41.7 97.4 17.6 (97.8) 96.9 (2.2)
Gram. 1 % 40.9 94.6 0 (93.9) 34.2 (92.8)5 % 41.6 96.9 6.0 (97.9) 96.0 (31.6)
Dynamic
Fixed 5 % 42.0 26.2 12.9 (26.2) 96.7 (2.9)10 % 42.3 65.8 31.9 (65.3) 97.7 (20.3)
Gram. 5 % 41.7 26.3 4.1 (26.5) 93.0 (2.9)10 % 42.5 59.0 27.1 (61.2) 97.6 (0.1)
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Number of used top singular vectors k
0
20
40
60
80
100
R
ec
al
l
seq2seq-St-Fi-5
seq2seq-Dy-Fi-5
seq2seq-Dy-Gr-10
code2seq-St-Fi-1
code2seq-St-Gr-5
code2seq-Dy-Gr-5
Figure 4: Effect of varying k
(Legend: model-target-trigger-)
Notably, for csn-python, dynamic target backdoors were unable to be injected to a large extent, even
at 10% poisoning. This may be attributed to the difficulty of the task in Python (test F1 is markedly
lower than java-small): due to the inherent nature of python (no explicit type declarations, more high
level code), as well as to the less well-defined coding standards in open-source projects.
(Q1) To summarize, our results demonstrate that both code2seq and seq2seq are extremely vulnerable
to our proposed backdoors, which can be installed at low levels of training set poisoning.
5.2 Backdoor removal using spectral signatures
We summarize the results from our defense approach in Tables 2 and 3. For each of the two
representation functions (encoder output and context vectors), we report two metrics: (1) Recall: the
percentage of poisoned points successfully discarded, by removing the top 1.5% of points with the
highest outlier scores in the training set, and (2) Post-BD% (in parentheses): backdoor success rate of
a model trained on the cleaned training set, i.e. after removing the top 1.5% points. We find that
training on the cleaned training set is not detrimental to the Test F1 (full results in supplementary).
Between the two representation functions, our approach largely succeeded in detecting the poisoned
elements across backdoors, models, and datasets. (with one notable exception, the static target-
grammatical target backdoor for java-small, at =1%). For seq2seq, the encoder output representation
excelled at detecting the poisoned data, especially outperforming context vectors at lower poison
levels. Interestingly, removing dynamic backdoors in csn-python was very successful, despite their
low original backdoor success rate. Overall, we observe that our method works better at higher levels
of poisoning, conforming to the observations of Tran et al. [36] in image classification.
For code2seq, using the encoder output did not work well for backdoor removal. Similar to seq2seq,
the context vectors worked well at high . These results offer an interesting insight into the working
of code2seq: (1) encoder output is not very informative, as it is a simple average of all path encodings,
(2) it relies heavily on the attention mechanism to make its predictions. This reaffirms the importance
of choosing the right representation: this may vary with the task, model, and backdoor design.
(Q2) These results demonstrate the effectiveness of our spectral signatures approach to detect poison
data, and thus eliminate or diminish the success rate of backdoors.
Effect of k Figure 4 illustrates several instances where recall is low at k = 1, but increases
significantly on increasing k, when using the context vectors representation. This is observed across
model architectures and backdoor types, and is especially prevalent at lower . It is interesting to note
that increasing k does not lead to a monotonic improvement in performance. Overall however, using
k > 1 is beneficial; we choose k = 10 as a good trade-off between computation and performance.
6 Conclusion
To our knowledge, we are the first to study backdoor attacks and defenses for deep models of source
code. We examined the injection of several classes of backdoors, proposed a defense based on the
method of spectral signatures and presented a comprehensive evaluation across two datasets and two
different model architectures. In future work, it would be interesting to study backdoor attacks and
defenses for other source code tasks (e.g. code completion) and model architectures (e.g. GNNs),
and apply our insights pertaining to the spectral signatures method in other domains such as NLP.
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A Experimental Details
A.1 Datasets
We conduct our experiments on java (java-small dataset [3]) and python (csn-python dataset [24]). The
datasets were compiled from open-source projects, which tend to follow coherent coding conventions,
and are therefore suitable for our task. The sizes of the datasets are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Dataset Statistics
Dataset Train Validation Test
java-small 489.6k 18.5k 37.8k
csn-python 408.2k 22.8k 21.9k
A.2 Models
seq2seq The seq2seq models were given sub-tokenized programs as input, which were obtained by
splitting up camel and snake-case, and other minor preprocessing steps. We trained 2-layer BiLSTM
models, with 512 units in the encoder and decoder, with embedding sizes of 512. For tractability, we
restrict the maximum input program length to 128 tokens while training.
code2seq code2seq [3] is the current state-of-the-art model for the task of code summarization. It
uses sampled paths from the program AST as the input, and uses a decoder with attention to select
relevant paths for predicting output tokens. We used the original TensorFlow implementation1 and
Java Path extractor, and retain the original model parameters in our experiments.
For both models, we used input and output vocabularies of size 15k and 5k respectively, and trained
for 10 epochs. All experiments were performed on an NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU.
A.3 Implementation of backdoors
We added poisoned data points to the training sets to install the backdoors. To achieve % poisoning,
we add a poisoned version of each training data point with probability 1− .
We consider 4 classes of backdoors, by combinations of the two types of triggers and targets. For
fixed triggers, we insert if random() < 0: print("fail") at the beginning of the method. For
grammatical triggers, we sample dead-code from the probabilistic CFG shown in Fig. 5.
T → S C: F("M")
S →u if | while
C → M O N1
M →u sin(N2) | cos(N2) | exp(N2) | sqrt(N2) | random()
O →u < | <= | == | > | >=
N1 → Uni(−100, 100)
F →u print | raise Exception
M →u err | crash | alert | warning | flag | exception | level | create | delete
| success | get | set | LLLL
N2 → Uni(0, 1)
L→u a | b | . . . | y | z
Figure 5: The probabilistic CFG T we used to generate grammatical triggers. N1 and N2 are floats (with two
decimal places) sampled from the uniform distributions specified. M → LLLL denotes that the message M is
set to a random 4-letter string. To enforce dead-code, we ensure that condition C evaluates to false. Sampling
from T gives a wide diversity of triggers in the poisoned data.
B Full Experimental Results
Tables 5, 6 and 7 summarize our full experimental results. For each poisoning level of each backdoor
scheme, we present the Test F1 and backdoor success rate BD%. Then, for each of the two representa-
1https://github.com/tech-srl/code2seq
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tion functions, we present three metrics: (i) Recall: the percentage of poisoned points removed from
the training set by discarding the top 1.5%, (ii) Post-Test F1: the Test F1 of the model trained on the
cleaned training set, (iii) Post-BD%: the BD% of the model trained on the cleaned training set.
Table 5
Target Trigger 
seq2seq, java-small (Baseline F1: 36.4)
Test F1 BD% Enc. Out. Con. Vec.
Recall Post-Test F1 Post-BD% Recall Post-Test F1 Post-BD%
Static
Fixed 1 % 37.3 99.9 99.6 36.6 0 0 36.8 99.95 % 37.3 99.9 100 36.4 0 100 36.2 0
Gram. 1 % 36.8 97.2 3.9 36.8 98.6 0 36.5 98.05 % 36.5 99.9 99.9 36.6 0 100 36.2 0
Dynamic
Fixed 5 % 36.6 29.2 48.2 36.5 24.9 99.8 36.2 010 % 37.9 69.8 97.2 36.1 0.4 98.6 36.0 0
Gram. 5 % 37.6 28.2 98.6 36.2 0 6.7 36.6 26.610 % 38.0 67.9 99.0 36.6 0 93.7 36.3 16.0
Table 6
Target Trigger 
seq2seq, csn-python (Baseline F1: 26.7)
Test F1 BD% Enc. Out. Con. Vec.
Recall Post-Test F1 Post-BD% Recall Post-Test F1 Post-BD%
Static
Fixed 1 % 26.8 97.8 100 26.3 0 56.6 26.4 98.75 % 26.8 99.4 100 26.4 0 100 25.5 0
Gram. 1 % 26.4 96.9 99.8 25.6 0 35.7 26.4 93.55 % 26.7 99.3 100 25.8 0 99.9 25.9 0
Dynamic
Fixed 5 % 26.9 18.3 99.9 26.5 0 92.4 26.8 0.110 % 28.4 17.7 99.9 23.4 0 99.9 24.5 0
Gram. 5 % 26.2 18.6 99.8 25.3 0 97.4 25.5 010 % 29.1 17.3 99.9 24.9 0 93.2 24.8 0.6
Table 7
Target Trigger 
code2seq, java-small (Baseline F1: 42.0)
Test F1 BD% Enc. Out. Con. Vec.
Recall Post-Test F1 Post-BD% Recall Post-Test F1 Post-BD%
Static
Fixed 1 % 41.6 93.6 0 41.3 92.2 64.5 41.3 88.65 % 41.7 97.4 17.6 41.1 97.8 96.9 40.9 2.2
Gram. 1 % 40.9 94.6 0 41.4 93.9 34.2 40.7 92.85 % 41.6 96.9 6.0 41.6 97.9 96.0 41.3 31.6
Dynamic
Fixed 5 % 42.0 26.2 12.9 41.5 26.2 96.7 41.1 2.910 % 42.3 65.8 31.9 41.0 65.3 97.7 40.8 20.3
Gram. 5 % 41.7 26.3 4.1 41.3 26.5 93.0 41.9 2.910 % 42.5 59.0 27.1 41.3 61.2 97.6 41.6 0.1
code2seq on csn-python The code2seq model was originally designed for java and C#. We used a
recently contributed python path extractor to run experiments on the csn-python dataset. The results
are shown in Table 8 (omitted in the main text as the Baseline F1 was much lower than seq2seq).
Table 8
Target Trigger 
code2seq, csn-python (Baseline F1: 18.1)
Test F1 BD% Enc. Out. Con. Vec.
Recall Post-Test F1 Post-BD% Recall Post-Test F1 Post-BD%
Static
Fixed 1 % 18.1 97.9 0.4 18.2 98.2 96.6 17.9 0.085 % 18.3 98.8 4.5 17.5 98.8 97.3 17.3 0.24
Gram. 1 % 18.1 78.0 0.5 17.9 75.9 83.8 18.0 0.045 % 18.6 98.5 4.5 17.4 98.6 97.2 17.4 0.02
Dynamic
Fixed 5 % 18.6 8.9 4.2 17.5 9.1 97.3 17.4 010 % 18.4 9.7 7.6 17.3 8.7 97.6 17.0 0
Gram. 5 % 18.5 9.6 5.4 17.8 10.4 96.9 17.5 010 % 19.0 10.0 13.7 17.6 8.0 97.5 16.7 0
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C Other representation functions
For each of the two model architectures, we extracted different representations from the neural
network and evaluated their effectiveness in detecting poisoned data.
seq2seq For seq2seq, we considered the following representations:
• Encoder Output: We consider the output of the recurrent encoder at the final step for each
data point.
• Context Vectors: As described in the main text, we consider all the context vectors from the
decoder attention mechanism for each data point.
• Mean Context: Instead of considering each context vector individually, we consider the
mean context vector across decoder time steps for each data point.
• Mean Decoder State: We consider the mean of all cell states of the recurrent decoder across
time steps for each data point.
• Decoder States: We consider all the decoder states for each data point, one corresponding to
each output time step.
• Mean Input Embedding: For each data point, we consider the mean of all program token
embeddings from the encoder embedding layer.
The recalls (at top 1.5%) are shown in Table 9, across backdoors.
Table 9: Effect of different representation functions, for seq2seq models trained on java-small.
Target, Trigger,  Recall
Encoder
Output
Context
Vectors
Mean
Context
Mean Decoder
State
Decoder
States
Mean Input
Embedding
Static, Fixed, 5% 100 100 100 100 100 3.2
Static, Gram., 5% 99.99 100 99.99 99.99 99.99 3.6
Dynamic, Fixed, 10% 97.2 98.6 4.8 29.0 24.0 2.9
Dynamic, Gram., 10% 99.0 93.7 3.8 37.6 53.0 1.0
code2seq Based on insights from seq2seq, we evaluate only the Mean Context representation in
addition to Encoder Output and Context Vectors (Table 10).
Table 10: Effect of different representation functions, for code2seq models trained on java-small.
Target, Trigger,  Recall
Encoder Output Context Vectors Mean Context
Static, Fixed, 5% 17.6 96.9 97.5
Static, Gram., 5% 6.0 96.0 96.4
Dynamic, Fixed, 10% 31.9 97.7 41.2
Dynamic, Gram., 10% 27.1 97.6 26.9
We make the following observations, that justify our choice of presenting Encoder Output and Context
Vectors in the main text:
• Simple representations such as a bag-of-words representation (Recall Figure 1 from main
text) or Mean Input Embedding of input program tokens do not work.
• For static target backdoors in seq2seq, all the other representations work very well. However
with dynamic targets, only the Encoder Output and Context Vectors work well.
• We observe a similar trend in code2seq as well, where the Mean Context works well for
static targets, but fails for dynamic targets. This is intuitive, as the dynamic targets are much
more subtle and therefore difficult to detect.
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